The work of Irving Janis and his colleagues has been immensely influential within the group communication literature, particularly for those who focus on group effectiveness. The groupthink hypothesis developed by Janis and others emerged from a detailed examination of the effectiveness of group decision making. Emphasizing critical thinking, Janis shows how certain conditions can lead to high group satisfaction but ineffective output.
Groupthink is a direct result of cohesiveness in groups. Kurt Lewin first discussed cohesiveness in some depth in the 1930s; the concept eventually was recognized as a crucial variable in group effectiveness. Cohesiveness is the degree of mutual interest among members. In a highly cohesive group, a strong mutual identification keeps a group together. Cohesiveness results from the degree to which all members perceive that their goals can be met within the group. This does not require that members have similar attitudes, but members of a cohesive group exhibit a degree of interdependence, relying on one another to achieve mutually desired goals. The more cohesive a group, the more pressure it exerts on members to maintain that cohesiveness.
Cohesiveness can be valuable because it brings members together and enhances interpersonal relationships. Although Janis does not deny its potential value, he also recognizes its dangers. One hazard is that highly cohesive groups may invest too much energy in maintaining goodwill, to the detriment of decision making. Members invest intrinsic energy in groups because of potential rewards such as friendship, prestige, and confirmation of self-worth. Because our self-esteem needs are high, we sometimes devote too much energy to establishing positive bonds, which can lead to groupthink.
Groupthink is especially likely when high cohesiveness is combined with structural faults such as insulation, inadequate counsel, poor decision-making procedures, closed-mindedness, or highly stressful and provocative situations. Janis identified several negative outcomes of groupthink: the group limits its discussion to only a few alternatives; it does not restudy the initially favored position for hidden pitfalls; it fails to reexamine alternatives originally disfavored by the majority; it avoids seeking outside expert opinion; it selectively gathers information that supports the favored plan; and it becomes so confident that it does not consider contingency plans. All of these outcomes result from a lack of critical thinking and overconfidence in the group.
Janis maintains that these outcomes are predicted by several symptoms that capture the essence of groupthink. The first symptom is an illusion of invulnerability, which creates unfounded optimism and a sense that no one should "rock the boat." The group then rationalizes its chosen course of action, creating stories that reinforce the belief that the decision is unquestionably correct. Members also maintain an unquestioned belief in the group's inherent morality, causing them to downplay ethical consequences.
Another symptom is stereotyping out-group leaders as evil, weak, or unintelligent. Direct pressure is exerted on members who express countering opinions, which leads to self-censorship. Members hesitate to voice reservations and suppress disagreement internally. This results in a shared illusion of unanimity, where the group outwardly appears fully united even when private doubts exist. Finally, self-appointed mindguards emerge to protect the group and its leader from dissenting opinions or contradictory information.
Janis offers several recommendations to reduce groupthink: encourage every member to be a critical evaluator; prevent leaders from stating preferences early; create multiple independent policymaking groups; divide the group into subgroups; consult with individuals outside the group; invite external experts to offer fresh ideas; assign a devil's advocate in every meeting; carefully examine warning signs; and hold a second-chance meeting to reconsider decisions before finalizing them.
Janis uses historical cases to support his theory, comparing instances of effective and ineffective decision making. The Kennedy administration's response to the Cuban missile crisis is an example of successful decision making. President Kennedy, having previously experienced groupthink during the Bay of Pigs invasion, actively encouraged open debate, withheld his own opinion during early discussions, formed independent subgroups, and consulted outside experts. These strategies helped the administration reach a successful resolution through a military blockade that halted Cuban-Soviet nuclear development.
Groupthink theory continues to stimulate research. For example, Dejun Kong and his colleagues studied satisfaction and performance in self-managed teams of senior professionals. They examined how team agreeableness—trust, altruism, and friendliness—shapes the relationship between satisfaction and performance. They found that satisfaction is positively related to performance when agreeableness is low, but that no relationship exists when agreeableness is high. This aligns with groupthink theory, as low agreeableness encourages more critical thinking rather than efforts to simply maintain harmony.
The next theories build on elements of groupthink and other frameworks to explore how communication helps groups make effective decisions.